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THE MATERIALITY OF MORALITY: CONFLICT MINERALS 
 
Alexandrea L. Nelson* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Shareholder activism is not a privilege—it is a right and a 
responsibility. When we invest in a company, we own part of that 
company and we are partly responsible for how that company 
progresses. If we believe there is something going wrong with the 
company, then we, as shareholders, must become active and vocal.1 
 
What is material to the investor? The traditional answer would be any 
financially relevant information that would change how an investor would make a 
purchasing decision. In 2010, Congress pushed securities regulation into a new 
realm of materiality: morality. Buried in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) is a mandate that requires the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules governing the disclosure of 
“conflict minerals.” 2  Coined the “Brownback Amendment,” 3  section 1502 of 
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to adopt new rules that would require certain public 
companies to report the use of conflict minerals originating in and around the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).4 
Conflict minerals include minerals and metals found in everyday items, from 
mobile telephones and gaming consoles to jet engine components. 5  Congress 
found that U.S. companies’ “exploitation” and use of conflict minerals originating 
in the DRC is aiding and financing a “conflict characterized by extreme levels of 
violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and 
gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian 
situation . . . .” 6  The motivation behind section 1502 was to use the threat of 
investor accountability to force U.S. companies to examine their supply chains and 
                                                     
* © 2014 Alexandrea L. Nelson. JD Candidate 2015. I would like to thank Professor 
Bill Richards for teaching me to think like a lawyer and Professor Jeff Schwartz for his 
assistance and thoughtful insight in developing this Note. I would also like to thank the 
Utah Law Review staff for their hard work and assistance. 
1  Mark Mobius, Knowing Your Shareholder Rights, FRANKLIN TEMPLETON INVS. 
(Apr. 2, 2010), http://mobius.blog.franklintempleton.com/2010/04/02/knowing-your-share 
holder-rights/. 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012).  
3  156 CONG. REC. S3976 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold) 
(stating that the “Brownback amendment is a significant, practical step toward” addressing 
the DRC crisis). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A). 
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2013). 
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1502(a), 24 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010). 
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determine whether their products are funding atrocious human rights violations. 
This marks a major shift in the SEC’s traditional role as a market regulator of 
financially material information or financial reporting that bears directly on a 
company’s stock performance.7 As such, section 1502, and the subsequent Conflict 
Minerals Rule adopted by the SEC, has been met with severe criticism.8 Scholars 
argue that not only will this disclosure rule be ineffective, but also that it is an 
inappropriate use of securities regulation because the information bears no relation 
to stock performance.9  
This Note has two purposes. The first purpose is to provide a thorough 
understanding of the Conflict Minerals Rule—to give a background of the rule, to 
understand Congress’s motivations, and to show how the rule will be influential in 
shaping investor behavior. To do this, Part II examines the history behind section 
1502, including the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, and Part III outlines the SEC’s 
implementation of section 1502 and its current legal challenges. The second 
purpose of this Note is to make an argument that despite its critics, section 1502 
represents inherently material information—that is, morality and humanitarian 
factors are material to investors. Part IV explores two arguments purporting that 
the Conflict Minerals Rule is a disclosure requirement that represents material 
information. First, aside from its humanitarian goals, section 1502 also represents 
real financial consequences including tort liability, insurance costs, and potential 
penalties related to international labor and humanitarian law violations. These 
costs are just as material to an investor as a quarterly earnings report. Second, the 
rise of the socially responsible investor has shifted the paradigm away from 
accounting and financial information, demanding more transparency on issues of 
human rights and social responsibility—issues of morality are material. Finally, 
Part V concludes.  
 
II.  DODD-FRANK AND THE DRC  
 
The global relief effort in the DRC is ongoing. Every year, the United States 
contributes millions of dollars to promote peace in the DRC region. 10  More 
                                                     
7 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate] (“[T]he SEC 
requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the 
public.”).  
8 See infra Part IV.  
9 See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as 
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2012) (“[T]he 
obligation to disclose a fact that, absent the legislative requirement, likely would not affect 
a reasonable investor’s decision to invest in a company, is problematic from both a 
securities law standpoint and a public international law standpoint . . . .”). 
10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: 
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT IS NEEDED TO DETERMINE AGENCIES’ PROGRESS TOWARD U.S. 
POLICY OBJECTIVES 12 (2007) [hereinafter DRC REPORT].  
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recently, Congress has tried several different legislative attempts to combat 
violence in the DRC.11 However, Dodd-Frank’s section 1502 comprises the first 
time Congress has successfully passed legislation that would create a system of 
supply-chain accountability, which theoretically will address violence in the 
DRC.12 This Part first outlines the complex DRC conflict. Next, this Part provides 
a brief outline of the past failed attempts in DRC legislation and the current Dodd-
Frank mandate.  
 
A.  An Estimated Forty-Five Thousand People Die Every Month in the DRC as a 
Result of Violence, Poverty, and Disease13 
 
The DRC is one of the most violent countries in the world. From 1998 to 
2007, an estimated 5.4 million Congolese people died as a result of “violence, 
disease, and starvation.”14 Located in the center of Africa, the country is roughly 
the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River.15 The current violence is 
a result of the DRC’s complicated history and two complex civil wars that raged 
between 1996 and 2003.16 Today, the DRC’s vast and lucrative natural resources 
are at the core of the continued violence.17 “[T]he mismanagement and illicit trade 
of extractive resources from the [DRC] supports conflict between militias and 
armed domestic factions in neighboring countries.”18 Armed groups use murder, 
starvation, and sexual crimes to maintain power over mining zones.19 The violence 
and instability created by armed groups has contributed to the DRC being one of 
the “poorest and least developed” countries in the world.20 In 2013, the Human 
Development Report ranked the DRC 186 on the Human Development Index, 
                                                     
11 See infra section II.B. 
12 See id.  
13 See Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2009).  
14  David C.W. Wagner, Note, Breaking the Nexus Between Armed Conflict and 
Consumer Products: Where’s the App for That?, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 103, 108 
(2012); see also S. 891, § 2(3). 
15 DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.  
16 A Short History of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
Involvement of NGOs in the Peace Process, WORLD MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.wmd.org/resources/whats-being-done/ngo-participation-peace-negotiations/hist
ory-conflict-democratic-republic (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
17 See DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5, 25 (noting that natural resources constitute 
the DRC’s primary exports and include “34 percent of world cobalt reserves; 10 percent of 
world copper reserves; 64 percent of world coltan reserves; and significant amounts of 
wood, oil, coffee, diamonds, gold, cassiterite, and other minerals” and that “[t]he DRC’s 
abundant natural resources are serving as an incentive for conflict between neighboring 
countries’ militias and armed domestic factions”). 
18 S. 891, § 2(5); see also DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 24–25. 
19 See S. 891, § 2.  
20 DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 7. 
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joining Niger in the lowest possible ranking out of the countries where data is 
available.21  
The DRC’s main exports include columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite, 
and gold.22 These resources are grossly undervalued, and armed groups profit from 
these resources by “coercively exercising control over mining sites from where 
they are extracted and locations along which they are transported for export.”23 
Armed groups use cheap mining practices to further obtain profit. Mining in the 
DRC is largely conducted through “artisanal miners, who use hand-held tools to 
extract minerals from underground sources and rivers.”24 These miners often work 
in deplorable conditions; they lack protective clothing and safety equipment, and 
they are often “exposed to a range of health risks, such as falling rocks and dust 
inhalation.” 25  Additionally, child labor is a common source of mining 
production.26 
Sexual violence and rape are common tools used by armed groups to maintain 
power over helpless mining communities. In 2010, a study revealed that DRC 
women are victimized at a rate of nearly one rape every minute.27 This study also 
estimated that around 1.8 million Congolese women have been victims of rape.28 
Widespread government corruption is also contributing to the crisis in the DRC. 
The DRC’s “weak and abusive security forces” are unable to eradicate the armed 
groups and are “poorly disciplined, ill equipped, and the worst abusers of human 
rights in the DRC.”29  
To combat the violence and the destruction, the U.N. has passed numerous 
resolutions,30 and the United States has provided millions of dollars in aid to the 
                                                     
21  U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, THE RISE OF THE 
SOUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD 147 (2013), available at http://hdr.undp. 
org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf. 
22 DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5; see also S. 891, § 2(8). 
23 S. 891, § 2(8). 
24 AMNESTY INT’L, PROFITS AND LOSS: MINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN KATANGA, 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 6 (2013), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
library/asset/AFR62/001/2013/en/7052e03b-89db-43b3-b607-7f0c8e11f18d/afr620012013 
en.pdf.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 14 (“The presence of child workers in the mines in Katanga is a serious 
problem. Some 40,000 children under the age of 16 years are believed to be working on 
mine sites in Kolwezi, Kipushi and Likasi.”). 
27 See Amber Peterman et al., Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against 
Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1060, 1064–65 
(2011) (estimating that every five minutes, four women in the DRC are raped). 
28 See id. at 1063.  
29 DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 19–20 (“[T]he DRC army is responsible for 40 
percent of recently reported human rights violations—including rapes, mass killings of 
civilians, and summary executions—and DRC police and other security forces have killed 
and tortured civilians with total impunity.”). 
30 See infra Part II.B.  
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DRC to improve security in an effort to curtail the violence.31 In 2007, the United 
States provided $181.5 million to the DRC in the form of humanitarian, economic, 
social-development, governance, and security aid.32 However valiant these efforts, 
the crisis in the DRC continues and the U.N. has urged its member states to 
“ensure that importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral 
products under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on 
the origin of the minerals they purchase.”33 The idea behind the U.N. resolutions 
was to force user accountability to defund armed groups causing instability in the 
region.34 As I will discuss below, the United States has answered this call by 
passing section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, which creates supply chain accountability.  
 
B.  Past Legislative Efforts to Combat Violence in the DRC and Dodd-Frank 
Section 1502 
 
In 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution that proclaimed its 
“grave concern at the repeated human rights violations” throughout the DRC and 
called on the “international community to increase, without delay, its support for 
humanitarian activities.”35 In 2010, the U.N. Security Council recommended that 
its member states “enhance information sharing [of conflict minerals practices] and 
joint action at the regional level to investigate and combat regional criminal 
networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources.” 36  Even before this admonition, and many others from the U.N., 37 
Congress first attempted to pass the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008 
(CCCA).38 The CCCA aimed to prohibit importation of products that contained or 
were derived from columbite-tantalite or cassiterite mined or extracted from the 
DRC. 39  Introduced in 2008, the CCCA never received a floor vote and thus 
failed.40 Congress’s second attempt was the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 
(CCMA).41 The CCMA resembled section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, and it called on 
the SEC to require annual disclosure of activities involving use of “columbite-
tantalite, cassiterite, and wolframite” from the DRC.42 However, the CCMA was 
                                                     
31 DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.  
32 Id.  
33 S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008). 
34 See id. 
35 S.C. Res. 1376, ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1376 (Nov. 9, 2001).  
36 S.C. Res. 1952, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1952 (Nov. 29, 2010).  
37 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1857, supra note 33, ¶ 15.  
38 Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008, S. 3058, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008). 
39 Id. pmbl. (stating the purpose of the bill was to “prohibit the importation of certain 
products that contain or are derived from columbite-tantalite or cassiterite mined or 
extracted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and for other purposes”). 
40 S. 3058 (110th): Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US, https:/ 
/www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3058 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
41 Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009). 
42 Id. pmbl. 
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also unsuccessful.43 The third and successful attempt was the addition of section 
1502 to Dodd-Frank.  
In passing section 1502, Congress felt that the need for conflict mineral 
disclosure was “literally [a] life-and-death issue.” 44 Section 1502 amended the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), adding a new disclosure 
requirement under subsection 13(p) that directs the SEC to create a rule to compel 
companies using conflict minerals to disclose that information on their websites.45 
Congress summed up its intent in introducing section 1502: 
 
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict 
minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping 
to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and 
gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian 
situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13(p) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).46 
 
Conflict minerals are defined under Dodd-Frank as “columbite-tantalite 
(coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or any other minerals or 
its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”47 Section 1502 will 
require companies using conflict minerals to undertake a diligent effort to 
determine whether those minerals originated in the DRC and adjoining countries.48 
If a company concludes after a diligent effort that their minerals are not directly or 
indirectly financing or benefiting armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries, 
the company may list their products as “DRC conflict free.” 49  To define and 
properly implement this law, Congress required the SEC to create rules that would 
fulfill this disclosure mandate no later than 270 days after the passage of Dodd-
Frank.50  
 
III.  THE SEC’S RULE AND SUBSEQUENT LEGAL CHALLENGE 
 
This Part will outline the SEC’s disclosure requirements under section 1502, 
the financial-reporting impact on U.S. companies, and the disclosure’s potential 
effect on future market behavior. This Part also discusses the first major legal 
                                                     
43 S. 891 (111th): Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, https://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s891 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  
44 156 CONG. REC. S3817 (May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(E) (2012). 
46 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 
§ 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010). 
47 Id. § 1502(e)(4).  
48 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A). 
49 Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii). 
50 Id. § 78m(q)(2)(A).  
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challenge to the Conflict Minerals Rule, its failure in the district court, and its 
pending appeal. 
 
A.  The SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule 
 
Dodd-Frank left many questions unanswered, with the SEC facing an uphill 
battle to determine some of the subtleties of the Dodd-Frank language. The 
Conflict Minerals Rule encompasses many public companies in the United States 
and, as such, has garnered national attention. 51  The rule is far reaching in 
determining which minerals qualify as “conflict” and which issuers under the 
Exchange Act are required to comply. The minerals the rule encompasses will be 
discussed here; the issuer requirements are better understood in the context of the 
rule’s application.  
The SEC adopted the same definition of a conflict mineral as Dodd-Frank, 
including “cassiterite, columbite-tantalite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives, or 
any other minerals or their derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be 
financing conflict in the Covered Countries.” 52  The following table lists the 
common industry uses of conflict minerals.53 
  
                                                     
51 See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,278 (Sept. 12, 2012) (discussing 
how the SEC received over thirteen thousand comment letters during the rulemaking 
process).  
52  Id. at 56,283. Many commentators admonished the SEC to define the term 
“derivatives” to ensure unambiguous application. Id. at 56,285. The SEC agreed with the 
“ambiguity” of the word and adopted the rule that derivatives are limited to the “3Ts”—
tantalum, tin, and tungsten—“unless the Secretary of State determines that additional 
derivatives are financing conflict in the Covered Countries, in which case they are also 
considered ‘conflict minerals.’” Id. 
53 Id. at 56,283–84.  
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Conflict Mineral Common Use 
Cassiterite Tin production which is used in alloys, 
tin plating, and solders for joining pipes 
and electric circuits 
Columbite-tantalite An ore from which niobium and 
tantalum is extracted 
Tantalum Mobile telephones, computers, 
videogame consoles, digital cameras, 
and used as an alloy for making carbide 
tools and jet engine components 
Gold Jewelry, electronics communications, 
and aerospace equipment 
Wolframite Mineral used to produce tungsten, 
which is used for metal wires; 
electrodes; and contacts in lighting, 
electronics, electrical, heating, and 
welding applications  
 
The SEC noted in its final report that “[b]ased on the many uses of these 
minerals, we expect the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision to apply to many 
companies and industries and, thereby, the final rule to apply to many issuers.”54 
The industry has estimated that this rule will affect at least six thousand issuers, 
which is about half of all publicly traded companies in the United States.55 The 
rule became effective November 13, 2012, with a compliance date of May 31, 
2014.56  
The Conflict Mineral Rule is fairly complex; however, it can be broken down 
into three general steps. Step one is a question of threshold, where issuers will have 
to examine whether their business practices fall within the purview of the rule.57 
Step two asks issuers who do fall within the rule to complete a “reasonable country 
of origin inquiry” to determine the source of their supply chain. 58  Step three 
requires companies that have found or suspect their materials originate in the DRC 
and surrounding countries (hereinafter referred to as “Covered Countries”) to 
conduct a chain of custody analysis to determine where in the Covered Countries 
the materials originate, whether in warlord-controlled mines or legitimate business 
operations.59  
                                                     
54 Id. at 56,284. 
55  KPMG INT’L, CONFLICT MINERALS PROVISION OF DODD-FRANK: IMMEDIATE 
IMPLICATIONS AND LONG-TERM OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPANIES 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/dodd- 
frank-conflict-minerals.pdf.  
56 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,309. 
57 Id. at 56,279.  
58 Id. at 56,280.  
59 Id. at 56,280–91.  
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1.  Issuers Required to Report Under the Conflict Minerals Rule 
 
There are two aspects of applying the first step of the Conflict Minerals Rule. 
First, the issuer must determine, based on its reporting status, whether the issuer 
categorically falls within the Conflict Mineral Rule.60 Second, if the issuer falls 
categorically within the rule, it must determine whether conflict minerals are 
necessary to the functionality or production of its product.61 
The Conflict Mineral Rule categorically applies to any issuer who “files 
reports with the Commission under Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange 
Act, including domestic companies, foreign private issuers, and smaller reporting 
companies.”62 The SEC determined this to be the appropriate application of section 
1502 because the only limiting factor found in the Dodd-Frank issuer language was 
that the minerals must be “necessary to the functionality or production of products 
manufactured or contracted by the issuer to be manufactured.”63 This definition of 
applicability sweeps up over half of the public companies in the United States.64 
Additionally, the rule was not confined to direct manufacturers using conflict 
minerals. The SEC determined that the congressional intent was to capture all 
issuers where “conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or production” 
of their products.65 Therefore, the rule applies to both directly manufacturing66 
issuers and issuers who contract to manufacture. 67  Issuers who contract to 
manufacture are those issuers who have “actual influence over the manufacturing 
of their products.” 68  The SEC provided the example of a cell phone service 
provider who specifies to the manufacturer that the device must be able to work on 
                                                     
60 Id. at 56,279. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 56,287. 
63 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
64 KPMG INT’L, supra note 55, at 2.  
65 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,290.  
66 Id. at 56,290–91.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 56,291. An issuer should not be viewed as contracting to manufacture a 
product if its actions involve no more than 
 
(a) Specifying or negotiating contractual terms with a manufacturer that do 
not directly relate to the manufacturing of the product . . . unless the issuer 
specifies or negotiates taking actions so as to exercise a degree of influence over 
the manufacturing of the product that is practically equivalent to contracting on 
terms that directly relate to the manufacturing of the product; or  
(b) Affixing its brand, marks, logo, or label to a generic product 
manufactured by a third party; or  
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a certain network.69 This type of market behavior does “not in-and-of-itself exert 
sufficient influence” to be considered “contract to manufacture.”70 
The Conflict Mineral Rule does not apply to “an issuer that mines or contracts 
to mine . . . unless the issuer also engages in manufacturing, whether directly or 
indirectly through contract . . . .”71 If the issuer finds that it does not manufacture 
or contract to manufacture conflict minerals, the issuer’s next step is to determine 
whether the use of conflict minerals are “necessary to the functionality or 
production” of their product.72 If so, Dodd-Frank mandates that issuers disclose 
such.73 
Whether a mineral is necessary to the functionality or production of a product 
was arguably the most contested portion of the Conflict Minerals Rule. The SEC 
chose not to define what is necessary to the production or functionality of a 
product, instead opting to provide issuers guidance. To determine what is 
necessary to the functionality of a product, the SEC suggested that an issuer should 
evaluate  
 
(1) Whether a conflict mineral is intentionally added to the product or 
any component of the product and is not a naturally-occurring by-
product; (2) whether a conflict mineral is necessary to the product’s 
generally expected function, use, or purpose; or (3) if a conflict mineral 
is incorporated for purposes of ornamentation, decoration or 
embellishment, whether the primary purpose of the product is 
ornamentation or decoration.74  
 
A similar standard applies to determine what is necessary to produce a 
product.75 Some issuers urged the SEC to adopt a de minimis exception to protect 
an issuer’s products that contain “trace, nominal, or insignificant amounts” of the 
conflict mineral. 76  The SEC cited the lack of a de minimis exception in the 
statutory language of section 1502 and relied heavily on the State Department’s 
                                                     
69 Id. at 56,291. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 56,292. 
72 Id. at 56,285. 
73 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(2)(B) (2012).  
74 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,279.  
75 Id. To evaluate what is necessary to the production of a product, the SEC suggested 
that issuers ask  
 
(1) Whether the conflict mineral is intentionally included in the product’s 
production process, other than if it is included in a tool, machine, or equipment 
used to produce the product (such as computers or power lines); (2) whether the 
conflict mineral is included in the product; and (3) whether the conflict mineral 
is necessary to produce the product. 
 
Id. 
76 See Id. at 56,295.  
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finding that many products contain conflict minerals in “very limited quantities” 
and, therefore, a de minimis exception “‘could have a significant impact on the 
final rule.’”77 If the issuer determines that conflict minerals are not necessary to the 
functionality or production of its products, the issuer’s reporting obligations end. 
All other covered issuers will proceed to step two.78  
 
2.  Determining Whether Conflict Minerals Originated in Covered Countries and 
the Resulting Disclosure 
 
Step two requires issuers to perform a “reasonable country of origin inquiry” 
to determine if their conflict minerals originated in the Covered Countries.79 This 
is the most discretionary step, allowing the issuer to determine the appropriate 
inquiry into the origination of its conflict minerals.80 The SEC has provided some 
guidance, requiring issuers to use due diligence “reasonably designed to determine 
whether the issuer’s conflict minerals did originate in the Covered Countries, or 
did come from recycled or scrap sources”; additionally, this inquiry must be 
completed in “good faith.”81 This may require issuers to obtain representations 
from facilities and immediate suppliers demonstrating that the conflict minerals did 
not originate in the Covered Countries.82  
Depending on the results of this inquiry, the issuer may need to proceed to 
step three. If the issuer finds that its conflict minerals did not originate in or “has 
no reason to believe” that its minerals “may” have originated in the Covered 
Countries (including recycled or scrap minerals), the issuer’s disclosure obligations 
are minimal.83 These issuers must disclose the results (e.g., scrap, recycled, or non-
Covered Country origin) and the steps taken in the reasonable country of origin 
inquiry to the SEC. 84  This disclosure is required on the Form SD or Special 
Disclosure that was created by the SEC to accommodate new disclosures under 
Dodd-Frank. 85  Additionally, an issuer will have to disclose that its conflict 
minerals did not originate in the DRC by posting the Form SD to the issuer’s 
website. 86  After these disclosures, the issuer’s reporting obligations end. 
                                                     
77 Id. at 56,298 (citations omitted).  
78 See id. at 56,283. 
79 Id. at 56,310. 
80 Id. at 56,311–12. The SEC determined that because a reasonable country of origin 
inquiry can “differ among issuers based on the issuer’s size, products, relationships with 
suppliers, or another factor,” issuers should be free to tailor their reasonable country of 
origin inquiry. Id. at 56,311. 
81 Id. at 56,312. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 56,313.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 56,280.  
86 Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058#.UuKEWmTn-iZ (last vi-
sited Mar. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
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Conversely, if the issuer “knows” or has “reason to believe” that its minerals 
originated in the Covered Countries, the issuer must proceed to step three.87  
 
3.  The Conflict Minerals Rule and Supply Chain Due Diligence 
 
Step three of the Conflict Minerals Rule applies to issuers who know or have 
reason to know that their conflict minerals originated in the Covered Countries. 
These issuers are required to use a “nationally or internationally recognized due 
diligence framework,” if available for the specific mineral, to determine the source 
and chain of custody of their conflict minerals.88 For each issuer, depending on the 
results of its due diligence and chain of custody analysis, the reporting obligations 
under the Conflict Minerals Rule will differ.89  
First, if an issuer finds its minerals are either from scrap or recycled sources 
or do not originate in the Covered Countries, the reporting obligations are 
minimal.90 These issuers are only required to file a Form SD disclosing the issuer’s 
findings (e.g., scrap, recycled, or non-Covered Countries origin), a description of 
the reasonable country of origin inquiry, and the issuer’s due diligence measures 
undertaken.91 The rule also requires the issuer’s determination to be posted on the 
issuer’s website and for the issuer to provide a link to this web address on the 
Form SD.92 
Second, if the issuer determines that its conflict minerals originate or may 
originate in the Covered Countries and are not from recycled or scrap resources, 
the issuer is required to complete a Conflict Minerals Report (CMR) in addition to 
the Form SD disclosures.93 The CMR is a reflection of the issuer’s conflict status 
(i.e., whether the minerals have or have not been found to be DRC conflict free).94 
For a product to be labeled “DRC conflict free,” an issuer must determine that its 
product “do[es] not contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or 
benefit armed groups” in the Covered Countries.95 Conversely, products that are 
not found to be DRC conflict free are products containing minerals that can be 
traced directly or indirectly to financing or benefiting armed groups.96 Every CMR 
must include “a description of the measures the issuer has taken to exercise due 
                                                     
87 Id.  
88 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,326. 
89 Fact Sheet, supra note 86.  
90 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,313.  
91 Id.  
92 See Fact Sheet, supra note 86. 
93 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,316. A CMR is an exhibit that is included in 
the Form SD report. Id. at 56,360. The issuer must also disclose a link to the issuer’s 
website where the CMR is publically available. Id.  
94 See id. at 56,320.  
95 Id. at 56,322. DRC conflict free issuers are not required to label their products as 
conflict free in the CMR; rather, issuers are permitted to disclose the lack of conflict on the 
Form SD. Id. at 56,323.  
96 See id. at 56,322.  
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diligence on the source and chain of custody of [the issuer’s] conflict minerals,” 
along with “a certified independent private sector audit.”97 The purpose of the 
private sector audit is to validate the CMR by ensuring that it conforms to a 
nationally recognized due-diligence framework.98 Additional disclosures may be 
required on the CMR depending on the issuer’s conflict status.  
Including the general CMR disclosures, issuers who are not DRC conflict free 
must also report the following on their CMRs: (1) which products manufactured 
are not DRC conflict free; (2) the facilities used in processing the conflict 
minerals; (3) the country of origin; and (4) the efforts to determine the location of 
the mine with the “greatest possible specificity.”99 Significantly, the SEC does not 
require that issuers label or disclose the conflict mineral status on their products;100 
rather, the CMR must be publically displayed only on the issuer’s website.101 DRC 
conflict free issuers have no further reporting obligations on the CMR.102  
Issuers that are unable to say with certainty where their minerals originated or 
whether their trade practices are benefiting or financing armed groups are given a 
two-year window in which they can label their products as “DRC conflict 
undeterminable.” 103  This allows issuers more time to investigate the chain of 
custody of their conflict materials. DRC conflict undeterminable issuers will 
include the following on their CMRs: (1) the products manufactured or contracted 
to be manufactured that are DRC conflict undeterminable; (2) country of origin, if 
known; (3) facilities used to process the conflict minerals; (4) the efforts 
undertaken to determine the mine location within the “greatest possible 
specificity”; and (5) the steps the issuer has or will take to mitigate the risk that its 
minerals will finance or benefit armed groups.104 No independent audit is required 
for this type of CMR.105 
 
B.  National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC106 
 
In true regulatory fashion, the Conflict Minerals Rule has received backlash 
from both the industry and scholars.107 The rule’s complexity and high cost of 
compliance have driven the industry to the courts. In July 2013, the District Court 
                                                     
97 Id.at 56,320. The independent private-sector audit must be conducted in accordance 
with the standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States. Id.  
98 Id. at 56,329.  
99 See Fact Sheet, supra note 86. 
100 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,323. 
101 See Fact Sheet, supra note 86. 
102 Id.  
103 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281. Smaller companies have four years. Id. 
at 56,321.  
104 See Fact Sheet, supra note 86. 
105 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,283. 
106 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). 
107 See, e.g., id. at 51–53 (summarizing commentator’s concerns with the passage of 
the Conflict Minerals Rule); Woody, supra note 9, at 1320.  
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for the District of Columbia ruled on the first major challenge to the SEC’s 
Conflict Minerals Rule.108 This litigation brought to light many of the industry’s 
issues with the SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank. The plaintiffs, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Business 
Roundtable, challenged the SEC’s implementation of section 1502 by posing three 
major questions to the court: (1) Is the SEC required to consider whether or not its 
rule will actually achieve Congress’s humanitarian goals? 109  (2) Was the SEC 
required to adopt a de minimis exception, despite the silence on the issue in the 
Dodd-Frank language?110 (3) By requiring disclosure on an issuer’s website, has 
the SEC improperly stigmatized speech and thus run afoul of the First 
Amendment? 111  Each of these challenges was unsuccessful, and the Conflict 
Minerals Rule remains on track for implementation in May of 2014.112  
 
1.  The SEC Was Not Required to Consider if the Conflict Minerals Rule Would in 
Fact Achieve Congress’s Goals of Defunding Armed Groups in the DRC 
 
First, the plaintiffs raised several challenges under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Exchange Act, claiming that the SEC failed to uphold its 
statutory duty to interpret Dodd-Frank. 113  The plaintiffs asserted that the SEC 
failed to analyze the costs and benefits of the rule “in contravention of its statutory 
directives under the Exchange Act.”114 Specifically, the plaintiffs urged the court 
to adopt a standard that would require the SEC to evaluate whether the Conflict 
Minerals Rule would achieve the humanitarian goals of section 1502.115 However, 
the court disagreed, finding that the Exchange Act places no such burden on the 
SEC.116 The court cited section 3(f) of the Exchange Act, which only requires the 
SEC to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”117 Additionally, in past 
precedent, courts have only invalidated an SEC rule where the SEC was 
“statutorily required” to evaluate the “economic implications” of implementing a 
new rule. 118  Therefore, the SEC “appropriately deferred to Congress’s 
determination” and was not required to weigh the effectiveness of the new rule on 
                                                     
108 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 61.  
109 Id. at 55–57.  
110 Id. at 61.  
111 Id. at 73.  
112 Id. at 82.  
113 Id. at 55–56.  
114 Id. at 55. 
115 Id. at 55–56. 
116 Id. at 56–57. 
117 Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).  
118 Id. at 57. The court further distinguished this case from past precedent, finding that 
past decisions invalidated rules where the SEC “of its own accord” identified a market 
problem and adopted its own rules to regulate the market. Id. at 58. 
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Congress’s humanitarian goals. 119  Moreover, the SEC fulfilled its efficiency, 
competition, and capital information mandate by properly considering the impact 
and cost of the rule on the industry.120 
 
2.  The SEC Was Well Within Its Discretion in Excluding a De Minimis Exception 
from the Final Conflict Minerals Rule 
 
The plaintiffs next challenged the SEC’s determination that Dodd-Frank did 
not mandate the adoption of a de minimis threshold exception.121 The plaintiffs 
fervently argued that Dodd-Frank required the SEC to adopt a de minimis 
exception that would exclude issuers whose products are made up of less than 1% 
of conflict minerals material.122 The plaintiffs argued that the lack of de minimis 
language in section 1502 left the decision to create a de minimis exception to the 
SEC and that the nature of the rule demanded that the SEC include a de minimis 
exception. 123  The SEC agreed that it had the authority but argued that if the 
Conflict Minerals Rule were to include a de minimis exception, the rule would 
inevitably be swallowed up.124 This is because when conflict minerals are used in 
products, they are often used in minimal amounts.125 Therefore, the SEC rejected 
the exception in an effort to further Congress’s disclosure goals. The court agreed, 
deferring to the SEC. It reasoned that the determination was the “product of 
reasoned decision-making,” upholding the rule on this point.126  
 
3.  The SEC Did Not Violate the First Amendment by Requiring Both Regulatory 
and Public Disclosures of Conflict Mineral Status  
 
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that “‘by compelling companies to publicly 
state on their own websites . . . that certain of their products are ‘not DRC conflict 
free,’” the Conflict Minerals Rule and section 1502 improperly compels 
“‘burdensome and stigmatizing speech’ in violation of the First Amendment.”127 
The disclosures at issue are the requirements to report, whether through a Form SD 
or a Conflict Mineral’s website, “conflict minerals sourcing practices.” 128  The 
court found that based on the commercial nature of the disclosures, it was required 
                                                     
119 Id. at 59.  
120 Id. at 61 (“While Plaintiffs, again, may disagree, the Court cannot say that the SEC 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in reaching this particular estimate.”). 
121 Id.  
122  Id. The plaintiffs argued that the statute neither forbids nor unambiguously 
forecloses the use of a de minimis exception. Id. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 62.  
125 Id. at 64. 
126 Id. at 66.  
127 Id. at 73.  
128 Id. at 76.  
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to apply intermediate scrutiny.129 The court applied the Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 130  intermediate scrutiny standard, 
which requires (1) an important and substantial government interest; (2) the 
interest to “directly advance[] the government interest asserted”; and (3) that “the 
fit between the ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable.”131  
The plaintiffs did not contest the first element, recognizing that Congress does 
have a substantial and important interest in “promoting peace and security in the 
DRC.”132 However, the plaintiffs argued that the disclosure requirements are too 
indirect and lack sufficient empirical support to advance the government’s 
purported humanitarian and foreign policy interests.133 The court rejected these 
arguments because the Supreme Court has found, in the context of foreign 
relations, that Congress need only act with “informed judgment rather than 
concrete evidence,”134 meaning Congress is free to paint with a broader brush in 
the arena of foreign relations.135 The court found that Congress acted within its 
“informed judgment” in concluding that in order to combat the problems in the 
DRC, the government must shed light on the system that is funding these 
operations.136 The plaintiffs also contended that the third prong of the analysis was 
not met.137  
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that by forcing a company to list products 
as “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free,’” the SEC imposes effectively a 
“scarlet letter” on issuers and there are other less restrictive measures the SEC 
could undertake to effectuate its goals.138 The court rejected this contention on 
many grounds. 139  First, issuers under the Conflict Minerals Rule are merely 
required to disclose information in a Form SD or CMR.140 In turn, these reports are 
then published on the company’s website. 141  Second, no issuer is required to 
physically label products “not DRC conflict free,” and issuers may clarify or add 
                                                     
129 Id. at 77 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980)). The court also hinted that if the disclosures were limited to SEC 
reporting and not available to the public, through the use of the issuer’s website, rational 
basis would likely be the reviewing standard. Id. at 76–77. 
130 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
131 Id. at 78. 
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 79 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727–28 
(2010)).  
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 80. 
137 Id. at 81. 
138 Id. at 82. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
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additional disclosure if desired.142 The court found that this was a “reasonable fit” 
under the Central Hudson standard.143  
The court’s ruling on the Conflict Minerals Rule was a major victory for 
conflict mineral activists. The celebration could be short lived, however. The case 
is currently on expedited review to the D.C. Circuit. But whatever the outcome, 
Dodd-Frank is still good law. The plaintiffs in this action are only seeking to chip 
away at the SEC’s rule. Therefore, even if the D.C. Circuit overturned part of the 
rule, it is unlikely that companies will evade conflict mineral disclosure in the 
future. The arguments in this case are best described as ways of buying the 
industry time to either change the law or delay implementation until the last 
possible moment. No matter the outcome of D.C. Circuit case, the normative 
arguments made in this Note remain—Congress has the power to promulgate 
disclosure requirements on morality issues. And, in many cases, morality is 
material.144  
 
IV.  MORALITY IS MATERIAL 
 
So far this Note has provided a look into how Congress is now using the SEC 
to implement congressional humanitarian goals in the DRC. Many have argued 
that this is an inappropriate use of the SEC’s delegated congressional authority. 
Traditionally, the SEC has been the watchdog of financially material information, 
or, more simply put, information that will affect an investor’s decision making 
when purchasing securities. It is important to note that the question of 
“materiality” is moot under the Conflict Minerals Rule because the legislative 
mandate requires disclosure regardless of materiality.145 However, the doctrinal 
question remains: Are human rights and other socially responsible goals a job for 
the SEC’s disclosure machine? Scholars are concerned that rules like the Conflict 
Minerals Rule are not aimed at material considerations but rather “underlying 
                                                     
142 Id. The court also noted that the phase-in period that allows issuers to temporarily 
label their products as “DRC conflict undeterminable” would help mitigate the plaintiffs’ 
concerns. Id. 
143 Id. 
144 As this Note goes to print, the D.C. Circuit is considering the matter. The court 
heard oral arguments on January 7, 2014. See Oral Argument Recordings, U.S. COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings.nsf/ 
DocsByRDate?OpenView&count=100&SKey=201401 (scroll down to “01/07/2014” and 
select link next to “Natl Assoc. of Manufactures v. SEC” to download recording of oral 
argument) (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).  
145  In the realm of securities regulation, either information is required under 
legislative disclosure mandates or a duty to disclose is created through the doctrine of 
materiality. However, the question of materiality underlies, traditionally, legislative and 
administrative mandates to disclose. See generally David Monsma & Timothy Olson, 
Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary 
Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
137, 144–56 (2007) (reviewing the general framework and explaining the regulations of 
disclosure requirements). 
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public policy” goals that are “not necessarily of interest to any investor.” 146 I 
disagree with this assessment. The Conflict Minerals Rule may effectuate public 
policy goals, but it also provides information that is inherently material to 
investors. 
To support this proposition, I will first outline, generally, the standard for 
materiality under our current securities laws. I will then provide two simple 
arguments: not only are human rights disclosures financially material, but so are 
the nonfinancial aspects of the Conflict Minerals Rule. While on their face, the 
humanitarian goals in the DRC do not seem inherently “financial,” human rights 
violations and a company’s involvement can translate into tort liability, insurance 
costs, or potential financial penalties related to international labor and 
humanitarian law violations. These costs, and the risks associated with them, are 
just as material to an investor as the information on a Form 10-K. Second, the rise 
of the socially responsible investor has shifted the paradigm away from accounting 
and financial information, demanding more transparency on issues of human rights 
and social responsibility. Socially responsible investors will accept lower returns 
for more humanitarian and socially responsible companies. In other words, a 
company’s use of DRC conflict minerals will in fact alter the total mix of 
information and influence how investors will make purchasing decisions. This is 
the essence of materiality.  
 
A.  What is Material? 
 
The Securities Act of 1933147 and the Exchange Act of 1934148 are together 
the foundation of modern securities regulation. The purpose of these laws is to 
protect the investing public when investors participate in the securities markets. 
Materiality is at the “core” of any “legal discussion of disclosure.”149 When a 
public company solicits the public for capital, a trade-off occurs. Companies agree 
to divulge any and all material information in exchange for access to the public 
marketplace. The SEC’s role and mission in this trade-off is to “protect investors, 
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”150 
The SEC has traditionally accomplished this goal by being the conduit in which 
                                                     
146 David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using 
the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 330, 354–55 
(2011); see also Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming 
Corporations Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t 
Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 391 (2013) (finding that section 
1502 was not “designed to protect or inform investors of material information, but rather, 
to stop a humanitarian crisis”).  
147 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).  
148 Id. § 78a.  
149 Monsma & Olson, supra note 145, at 142–43. 
150  Investor’s Advocate, supra note 7 (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 
and facilitate capital formation.”) 
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the investing public receives financially material information.151 As distilled by the 
Supreme Court, a material fact is a fact where there is a “substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.” 152  Put differently, the material fact would likely influence how an 
investor would vote and make investing decisions. Commentators have argued that 
section 1502 does not meet this standard because social and humanitarian 
responsibility does not bear on the financial condition or economic value of a 
company.153 In this next section, I will argue that these critics think too narrowly 
of the concept of materiality and overlook how the Conflict Minerals Rule fits 
precisely within the materiality definition.  
 
B.  The Conflict Minerals Rule Is Inherently Material 
 
As aforementioned, there are two arguments that the Conflict Minerals Rule 
represents inherently material information. First, the Conflict Minerals Rule 
represents real financial consequences for companies engaged in illicit trading 
practices. Second, socially responsible investing has shifted the traditional 
materiality definition into nonfinancial factors such as morality.  
 
1.  The Conflict Minerals Rule Provides Investors with Material Information that 
Directly Weighs on the Profitability of a Company 
 
The Conflict Minerals Rule is related to the financial and economic stability 
of a company. When a company engages in risky trade practices, like the transport 
and trade of conflict minerals, the issuer exposes the company purse to tort 
liability, insurance costs, and potential penalties for violating international labor 
and humanitarian laws.154 For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) 
has successfully sued numerous U.S. companies, in U.S. courts, for human rights 
violations around the globe.155 One example is Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,156 where 
CCR reached a settlement with Unocal Corporation for its human rights violations 
                                                     
151 See id.  
152 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (citations omitted). 
153  See, e.g., Woody, supra note 9, at 1340–42 (“[D]isclosure of social and 
environmental information is typically not required because that information, to date, has 
not been regarded as relevant or material to the financial condition of a company.”). 
154 See Eric Engle, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Human Rights, Shareholder 
Activism and SEC Reporting Requirements, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 63, 83−84 (2006). 
155 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE 3 
(2014), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_Corp.pdf. 
156 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(dismissing the panel decision and vacating the district court decision on stipulated 
motion). 
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in Burma.157 There, four Burmese citizens sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 
for human rights violations, assault, forced labor, wrongful death, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and imprisonment because of the company’s 
involvement in the Myanmar gas pipeline.158 The Burmese military surrounding 
the pipeline project had committed these crimes against the Burmese citizens.159 
Another potential financial liability a corporation may face is violation of 
international pillaging law. 160  Pillaging law prohibits theft such as looting, 
spoliation, and plundering during war and other armed conflicts.161 Some scholars 
suggest that the law of pillaging is an avenue to hold corporate actors criminally 
liable for taking advantage of unstable situations, like that in the DRC, for the 
exploitation of natural resources. 162 As investors learn about these risk factors 
associated with human rights violations, including ATS liability and pillaging 
laws, investors will recognize that “non-compliance represents a significant and 
largely preventable financial risk, and thus alter their investment patterns 
accordingly.”163 
The Conflict Minerals Rule can be juxtaposed with disclosure guidance 
adopted by the SEC in 2010 that requires companies to disclose how their business 
practices affect climate change.164 The general motivation behind the SEC issuing 
disclosure guidance was that investors had the right to know whether issuing firms 
faced significant environmental regulation and potential litigation liabilities.165 In 
                                                     
157 Recently, however, the Supreme Court significantly raised the bar for victims of 
human rights violations to sue in federal court. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013). But there remains a significant scholarly discussion as to 
Kiobel’s real effect. See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Essay, Human Rights Litigation and the 
National Interest: Kiobel’s Application of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to 
the Alien Tort Statute, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 107, 108 (2013) (“[E]ven as Kiobel imposes a 
new territorial nexus requirement, it leaves open the possibility that some consideration 
may be given in future cases to how ATS suits advance U.S. interests in determining 
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is displaced.”). Additionally, many 
agree that Kiobel has simply shifted the venue for human rights activities to arenas like 
state court. See, e.g., Chistopher A. Whytock et al., Forward: After Kiobel—International 
Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 5 
(2013) (“[I]f substantive and procedural barriers to human rights litigation under U.S. 
federal law in the U.S. federal courts continue to grow, plaintiffs alleging human rights 
violations are increasingly likely to consider pursuing their claims in state courts or under 
state law.”). 
158 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 937–45. 
159 Id. 
160 JAMES G. STEWART, PROSECUTING THE PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 75–82 
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1875053. 
161 Id. at 15–17. 
162 See, e.g., id. at 75–82.  
163 Engle, supra note 154, at 89.  
164 See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 
Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,293 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, & 241).  
165 Id. at 6,291.  
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this instance, the SEC responded to investors who felt that companies were not 
providing enough data on the potential risks to their profits and operations from 
environmental protection laws.166 Similarly, one can view the Conflict Minerals 
Rule as Congress’s recognition of not only the humanitarian benefits of disclosure, 
but also of the benefits that will be realized by investors seeking materially 
relevant information. Admittedly, the Dodd-Frank statutory language is divorced 
of any language hinting at investor materiality.167 However, Congress arguably 
used the SEC to effectuate this goal because Congress understood that conflict 
mineral information would be material to investors and would incite change in 
market behavior. The SEC recognized this underlying motivator in the rule release, 
finding that the Conflict Minerals Rule will “provide information that is material to 
an investor’s understanding of the risks in an issuer’s reputation and supply 
chain.”168 Additionally, one commentator noted that the benefits of the Conflict 
Mineral Rule would eliminate  
 
competitive disadvantage to companies already engaged in ensuring their 
conflict mineral purchases do not fund conflict in the DRC, providing an 
opportunity to improve a company’s existing risk management and 
supply chain management, stimulating innovation, supporting 
companies’ requests for conflict minerals information from suppliers 
through legal mandate, and preparing companies to meet a new 
generation of expectations for greater supply chain transparency and 
accountability.169 
 
Therefore, the Conflict Minerals Rule arguably presents investors with financial 
information that is just as potent as any other SEC filing.  
 
2.  The Nonfinancial Moral Factors of the Conflict Minerals Rule Are Material to 
Investors 
 
Aside from being financially relevant, the Conflict Minerals Rule also 
implicitly recognizes the undercurrent of important nonfinancial material 
information in the marketplace. Socially responsible investing has been on the rise 
                                                     
166 See Jim Efstathiou Jr., SEC Sets Corporate Climate-Change Disclosure Standard 
(Update1), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2010, 1:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=aPXp9qdIIlhg. 
167 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1502, 24 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (2010). 
168 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,276 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R pts. 240 & 249b).  
169 Id. at 56,279. IBM is an example of a firm that has embraced the Conflict Minerals 
Rule, recognizing the competitive advantage of supply chain accountability. See IBM, 2012 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 126 (2012) (“[IBM] understand[s] the importance of 
achieving a supply chain that uses only responsibly sourced minerals.”), available at http:// 
www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/2012/supply-chain/conflict-minerals.html.  
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for years. 170  Investors are increasingly relying on “social, environmental, and 
governance” information, or what has been called “SEG” information, to make 
investing decisions. 171  Investors are already using SEG information to “decide 
proxy votes,” “screen mutual funds,” and make “investment related decisions.”172 
These investors make investment decisions with SEG information that “is clearly 
material to them, irrespective of its economic implications.”173 Professor David 
Monsma argues, “In a world where social and environmental risks play a greater 
role in investor decisions . . . materiality expands to encompass these risks and 
thereby creates a new legal threshold for disclosure.”174  
Arguably, many investors, not just socially responsible investors, will be 
hesitant to invest in organizations that are funding rape, murder, and starvation in 
the DRC.175 These motivators are not financial, but moral, and carry with them the 
power to profoundly shape how investors make purchasing decisions. However, 
scholars caution that it will be difficult going forward to draw a line regarding the 
“use of the public disclosure system contemplated by the federal securities laws for 
the purposes of addressing social, public policy, and geo-political concerns.”176 I 
believe this concern is misguided. Line drawing will occur naturally in the 
marketplace. For example, arguably not every humanitarian or social issue will rise 
to the level of materiality. Investors will examine the severity of the crisis and, 
most importantly, the strength of the relationship between the humanitarian harm 
and the corporate involvement. The stronger this relationship is, the more severe 
the harm and the more likely investors will find the information material and 
demand company disclosure. In section 1502, Congress has simply codified a 
market need that has already been set in motion. Increasingly, issuers have begun 
to volunteer SEG information—recognizing that investors want more than 
financial information when investing. 177  The threat of investor accountability 
created by the Conflict Minerals Rule will change trade practices in the DRC 
through investors’ access to new information. Whether or not the change will bring 
peace to the Congolese people is the subject for another article. What is relevant is 
                                                     
170 The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment estimates that as of 2012, 
there is over $3.74 trillion in assets managed according to SEG criteria; this is a 22% 
increase since the end of 2009. See US SIF, REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/ 
files/Publications/12_Trends_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
171 Monsma & Olson, supra note 145, at 143. 
172 Id. at 160. 
173 Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1288–89 (1999).  
174 Monsma & Olson, supra note 145, at 199. 
175 Supra section II.B.  
176 Lynn, supra note 146, at 339.  
177 Engle, supra note 154, at 84; see also Amol Mehra, More than CSR: The Benefits 
of Conflict Minerals Disclosure to Business and Investors, FORBES (May 9, 2012, 6:37 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2012/05/09/more-than-csr-the-benefits-of-conflict-m 
inerals-disclosure-to-business-and-investors/. 
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that this information, while not financial, is material, and I believe we will 
continue to see Congress and the SEC demand more socially responsible 
disclosures in the future.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Conflict Minerals Rule is an appropriate use of the SEC’s disclosure 
power. Issues of morality that arise in a humanitarian crisis like that in the DRC 
are inherently material. The takeaway from this discussion is that U.S. companies 
cannot ignore the paradigm shift that is occurring in securities regulation. Congress 
will continue to use the powerful reporting mechanism of the SEC to require 
disclosures of nonfinancial material information like the illicit trade in the DRC. 
Whether the DRC will reap the benefits of these disclosures remains to be seen. 
